The bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa is an opportunistic human pathogen that uses a quorum sensing signal cascade to activate expression of dozens of genes when sufficient population densities have been reached. Quorum sensing controls production of several key virulence factors, including secreted proteases such as elastase. Cooperating groups of bacteria growing on protein are susceptible to social cheating by quorum-sensing defective mutants. A possible way to restrict cheater emergence is by policing where cooperators produce costly goods to sanction or punish cheats. The P. aeruginosa LasR-LasI quorum sensing system controls genes including those encoding proteases and also those encoding a second quorum-sensing system, the RhlR-RhlI system, which controls numerous genes including those for cyanide production. By using RhlR quorum sensing mutants and cyanide synthesis mutants, we show that cyanide production is costly and cyanideproducing cooperators use cyanide to punish LasR-null social cheaters. Cooperators are less susceptible to cyanide than are LasR mutants. These experiments demonstrate policing in P. aeruginosa, provide a mechanistic understanding of policing, and show policing involves the cascade organization of the two quorum sensing systems in this bacterium. 
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bacterial communication | cooperation | social evolution | sociomicrobiology T he opportunistic human pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa uses acyl-homoserine lactone (AHL) quorum sensing to activate approximately 300 genes (1, 2) . There are two AHL quorum-sensing systems, the LasR-LasI system and the RhlR-RhlI system. LasI catalyzes the synthesis of a diffusible quorum-sensing signal, N-3-oxo-dodecanoyl homoserine lactone (3OC12-HSL), which binds to the transcription factor LasR (3). LasR activates many genes including those encoding extracellular proteases such as elastase (4, 5) and the rhlI and rhlR genes in response to 3OC12-HSL binding. RhlI catalyzes production of the freely diffusible butyryl-HSL (C4-HSL) and, in response to C4-HSL, the transcription factor RhlR activates a set of genes, which overlap those activated by LasR (1, 6, 7). The RhlR-activated genes include genes for production of toxic compounds like cyanide (1, 8) .
LasR induction of extracellular proteases is an example of quorum-sensing control of a cooperative activity (9) (10) (11) . The proteases benefit any member of the population regardless of whether an individual produces proteases itself. The proteases can be considered public goods (11) , and there is an incentive to cheat, to gain the benefit of public goods without paying a public goods production cost. In fact, after approximately 50-100 generations of growth on casein as the sole source of carbon and energy, P. aeruginosa LasR mutants emerge and reach a stable equilibrium with the quorum-sensing wild-type cooperators (12, 13) . The fact that cooperators and cheats reach a stable equilibrium suggests the possibility that as cheats accumulate they pay some cost, which limits their fitness advantage. In mixed populations of quorum-sensing cooperators and quorum-sensing defective cheats, the cooperators activate the RhlR-RhlI system, but the LasR mutant cheats cannot activate this system. We hypothesized that RhlR-RhlI induction of cyanide is coupled to induction of cyanide resistance, and that growth of cheats will be compromised as a result of cooperator-produced cyanide. We describe experiments with RhlR mutants and cyanide-synthesis mutants that support our hypothesis. The production of cyanide by cooperators has some cost, but it provides a benefit to the cooperators in that it enables them to control cheater subpopulations. This cheater control is by definition a policing system where cooperators produce costly goods to sanction or punish cheats (14) .
Results

RhlR
− Cooperators Fail To Control Social Cheaters. When wild-type P. aeruginosa is grown on casein as the sole source of carbon and energy, it requires the secretion of a quorum-sensing-induced protease to liberate amino acids and peptides for uptake and use. In laboratory evolution experiments, after 2 to 3 wk of daily transfer in minimal casein broth, LasR mutant cheats emerge and come to equilibrium with the cooperators (Fig. 1 and refs. 12 and 13). The cheats can be identified by their pattern of growth on agar plates containing skim milk. A zone of skim milk clearing forms around protease-producing colonies but not around protease-negative cheats (13) . Our hypothesis is that RhlR-activated production of cyanide by cooperators serves to police cheats. Thus, we predict that if evolution experiments are performed with RhlR mutants there will be a policing defect, cooperators will not be able to punish or control cheats, the cheats should overrun the population, and there will be insufficient numbers of cooperators to support growth on casein, thus causing the population to collapse. As reported (12, 13) when we initiated a laboratory evolution experiment with wild-type P. aeruginosa growing on casein broth, social cheaters emerged after 10-15 d. In three individual experiments (Fig. 1A) , the cheaters and cooperators reached a stable equilibrium.
Significance
Cooperation is subject to social cheating. Cheats benefit from the activity of cooperators and gain a fitness advantage. One way higher organisms prevent infiltration by cheats is policing: Cooperators penalize cheats at some cost to themselves. Cooperating groups of bacteria are susceptible to social cheating, but little is known about bacterial policing. We have built on an understanding a quorum-sensing regulated cooperative activity in Pseudomonas aeruginosa to show that quorum sensing control of and resistance to cyanide production serves as a cheater policing mechanism. Understanding how bacteria cooperate and how they control social cheats has evolutionary implications, provides important insights about ways to control bacterial populations, and has ramifications with respect to synthetic system design. To test our hypothesis that RhlR-controlled factors might be responsible for the establishment of this equilibrium, we conducted nine independent laboratory evolution experiments in which we transferred a RhlR mutant daily on casein broth. We found that cheats emerged in six of the nine experiments at variable times, and once they emerged, their relative abundance increased rapidly ( Fig.  1 A and B) . We sequenced lasR and flanking DNA from a representative protease-negative isolate from five experiments in which cheats accumulated. All five isolates had lasR mutations (Table 1) . There was more diversity in the lasR mutations than in those identified in previous studies in which the cheats evolving from wild-type P. aeruginosa had single amino acid substitutions in LasR (12, 13) . The lasR mutations arising in the RhlR − cheats include single amino acid substitutions, stop mutations, and large deletions of lasR and the flanking genes (Table 1) .
To confirm that the population phenotype was attributable to the absence of RhlR activity, we repeated the experiment by using a RhlI − cooperator. This strain lacks the C4-HSL signal synthase. Outcomes were similar to outcomes with the RhlR − cooperators. Once cheaters emerged, their abundance rose rapidly and was followed by a population collapse (Fig. 1C) . RhlR function in the RhlI − strain can be restored by the addition of C4-HSL to the growth media. Inoculation of C4-HSL in the casein broth resulted in a stable equilibrium between the RhlI − cooperators and cheaters and phenocopied results with wild-type P. aeruginosa (Fig. 1D) (15) No mutation NA NA Cooperator 2 (23) No mutation NA NA Cooperator 3 (28) No mutation NA NA *One cheater from each of five experiments in which a collapse occurred. We also sequenced lasR in representative cooperators from the three experiments where cheaters did not arise. In these cases, we found wild-type lasR genes. Isolates were taken on the days shown in parentheses. † The nucleotide changes with respect to the parent strain PAO1 are shown. ‡ The genes inactivated by the mutations in each representative. § NA, not applicable.
that HcnC − mutants should grow better than the wild type in pure culture. In fact, HcnC − -cooperator cell yields were measurably higher than wild-type yields (Fig. 2B) , resulting in the high carrying capacity of cheaters ( Fig. 2A) we observed before population collapse.
The competition experiments support the view that cyanide production by wild-type P. aeruginosa places cheaters at a disadvantage and that RhlR control of cyanide intoxication and detoxification serves as a policing system. To provide further evidence to support this concept, we grew populations separated by dialysis membranes to determine whether a soluble factor or factors mediated policing. We grew RhlR − mutants or wild-type bacteria in a dialysis bag surrounded by a culture of wild-type bacteria and found that compared with growth of wild type in a dialysis bag, there was a two-log reduction in RhlR − mutant numbers (Fig. 3) . In a control experiment with the HcnC − mutant outside and inside the bag, the bacterial yields were similar to those attained with wild-type inside and outside. We observed similar yields when the HcnC − mutant was outside and a RhlR − mutant was inside the bag (Fig. 3) . Thus, we conclude that cyanide production is required for wild-type suppression of RhlR − mutant growth in this environment.
Discussion
We are interested in the elaborate P. aeruginosa quorum-sensing network and how it controls cooperative activities. Cooperation presents a social dilemma. Individuals that do not contribute their share of goods for cooperation should have a fitness advantage over fully participating cooperators and destabilize cooperating groups by natural selection. Nevertheless cooperation clearly exists. One can imagine a variety of solutions to the social dilemma. Kin selection or discrimination through spatial structure has been invoked (16) (17) (18) (19) as has the idea of greenbeard genes, which code for products that cause in carriers both a phenotype that can be recognized by other carriers (a greenbeard) and a cooperative behavior toward others who show a greenbeard (20, 21) . Coregulation of genes coding for cell-associated activities with genes for shared goods can place a metabolic restraint on cheating as we have shown in P. aeruginosa (12) . Another possible solution to the social dilemma is policing where cooperators act to hinder the success of social cheats at some expense to themselves. There are many examples of policing in animals (for instance, see ref. 22 ). For example, insects police worker reproduction (23) to increase the reproductive efficiency of the colony. Among primates, macaques have been shown to engage in policing to minimize conflict and reinforce social networks (24) . There are, however, few reports of policing in bacteria (25, 26) , and little is known about the molecular basis of policing in bacteria. We show here that policing of social cheats in populations of P. aeruginosa cooperating to grow on casein occurs, that it involves the quorumsensing signal cascade, and we reveal a physiological mechanism for policing.
We tested the hypothesis that LasR coregulation of the RhlR-RhlI system with extracellular protease production enables policing. A simple test of this hypothesis was to initiate social evolution experiments with a LasR
− cooperator. This cooperator should have a policing defect and be unable to control the emergence of cheats. Our results were consistent with the hypothesis (Fig. 1) . As has been reported (12, 13) with wildtype P. aeruginosa, cheats emerged from LasR + , RhlR + cooperators and reached a stable subpopulation over a period of 2 to 3 wk, whereas in six of nine evolution experiments with RhlR − cooperators, cheats emerged, rapidly became a dominant component of a population, and within 5 d of our initial detection of cheats there were insufficient numbers of cooperators for further transfer ( Fig. 1 A and B) . Of note, in three of the nine experiments, cheats did not emerge at all (Fig. 1 A and B) . There must be some alternate evolutionary path under these conditions, but we have not studied these lineages further. It is also interesting that there was considerable diversity in the types of lasR mutations that arose from RhlR mutant cooperators in comparison with the mutants that arise from wild-type cooperators. We do not understand the significance of this finding.
Further support of the policing hypothesis came from competition experiments with genetically defined cheats and cooperators (Table 2) . We tested the hypothesis that RhlR activation of cyanide synthesis gene expression was critical for policing in the casein medium in two ways. We performed competition experiments between cyanide-deficient cooperators and cheaters (Fig. 2) , and we showed that wild-type cyanide-producing cooperators, but not cyanide-negative cooperators, produce a diffusible compound that impairs the growth of RhlR mutants (Fig.  3) . Our findings support the view that, under some conditions, LasR-dependent quorum sensing controls production of extracellular proteases, which are public goods. Coregulation of RhlR quorum sensing and subsequent RhlR-dependent cyanide production can serve as a policing mechanism that constrains lasR mutant cheats in populations of cooperators. It is also possible that other RhlR-regulated factors including phenazines (8) might contribute to the policing effect under other environmental circumstances. Multiple potential policing factors regulated by RhlR might be beneficial at deterring "second-order" cheating, for instance by serial mutation of hcnC and lasR, although we have no direct experimental evidence to suggest deterrence by other factors.
We view RhlR-dependent policing as imperfect in that cheats emerge and coexist with cooperators (refs. 12 and 13 and Fig. 1 ), which is in contrast to the internal deterrence to cheating we showed previously (12) . This metabolic constraint is more robust, but it requires additional environmental conditions. We also must point out that in P. aeruginosa cyanide production can serve functions other than policing. Cyanide can be considered a virulence factor for this opportunistic pathogen (27) , and although we are unaware of experimental evidence, it seems logical that cyanide production can protect P. aeruginosa against competition from cyanide-sensitive bacterial species. In a broader sense, we view social behaviors as conditional. What may be a beneficial social behavior in one context may have entirely different functions in other contexts. Approximately 300 genes are activated by quorum sensing in P. aeruginosa (1). Expression of this large regulon must come at considerable cost to cells and with substantial evolutionary pressures against maintenance of such an expensive regulatory circuit. We have learned that there are multiple innate factors that can serve to stabilize P. aeruginosa quorum sensing. Metabolic prudence allows P. aeruginosa to activate certain quorum-controlled genes only when their production does not burden the population (28) . Coregulation of public and private goods penalizes quorum-sensing mutants (12) . And now we show that built into the P. aeruginosa quorum sensing signal cascade is a policing mechanism whereby cooperators can constrain LasR − social cheaters. We believe that our identification of a bacterial policing mechanism lends insight that will allow identification of other similar systems in the bacterial world.
Materials and Methods
Bacterial Strains and Media. Bacteria were grown in minimal medium with 1% (wt/vol) sodium caseinate as carbon source (casein broth) (12) or in MOPSbuffered Luria-Bertani (LB) broth as indicated (29) . We used the following P. aeruginosa strains in our experiments: PAO1-UW (30) and PAO1-UWderived rhlR, rhlI, hcnC, and lasR, hcnC mutants. We used a homologous recombination approach to generate mutants as described (31) . PCR-amplified DNA fragments flanking rhlR, rhlI, hcnC, and lasR were cloned into pEXG2, which was used to transform Escherichia coli S17-1, and then the pEXG2 derivatives were crossed into PAO1-UW. Transconjugants were selected on Pseudomonas Isolation Agar containing gentamicin, and deletion mutants were selected with Pseudomonas Isolation Agar containing 5% (wt/vol) sucrose. Mutant construction was confirmed in all cases by PCR.
Inocula for experiments in casein broth were from overnight-buffered LB cultures. The initial optical density was 0.01 (600 nm). This optical density corresponds to 1-3 × 10 7 colony-forming units (cfu) per mL. We transferred 25-50 μL at 24-h intervals in fresh casein broth with the exception of the RhlR − cooperator, which required larger inocula at days 1-3 (200 μL) likely because of the cooperative regulation of lasB by RhlR and LasR (1, 32) . Unless otherwise specified, cultures were grown in 4 mL of casein broth in 16-mm test tubes with shaking at 37°C. As described (12), we determined cheater abundance by plating cells on buffered LB agar and transferring isolated colonies to skim milk-agar plates where a zone of skim milk clearing arose around LasR + colonies but not around colonies of LasR − social cheats. For each value reported, we screened at least 100 colonies.
Competition Experiments. We combined two individual strains, at the ratios indicated in the text, each grown separately overnight in buffered LB, by inoculating casein broth. At 24-h intervals, we transferred 50 μL to fresh PMcasein broth. On day 5 (or earlier if there was no growth after transfer before day 5), cells were plated for isolated colonies on buffered LB agar. We determined cheater abundance and cell numbers as described above.
Dialysis Membrane Experiments. Three milliliters of casein broth was inoculated with the indicated strain (initial optical density at 600 nm, 0.01). The inoculated broth was sealed in a dialysis cassette. P. aeruginosa PAO1 or the HcnC − mutant were used to inoculate 750 mL of casein broth in a 2-L flask (initial optical density at 600 nm, 0.05). The dialysis cassettes were placed in the flasks, and the flasks were incubated at 37°C with shaking (180 rpm) for 48 h. Bacteria in the dialysis cassettes were enumerated by plate counting at either 24 h or 48 h of incubation.
DNA Sequencing. Bacteria from individual colonies were picked and grown in buffered LB broth overnight. Cells were harvested by centrifugation and DNA was extracted by using a Puregene cell extraction kit (Gentra). We amplified a large area flanking lasR, rsaL, and lasI (nucleotides 1555012-1561918) and used standard Sanger sequencing to identify mutations. For the large deletions, we amplified the same region encompassing PA1429-PA1433 and used Illumina sequencing of the PCR product to determine the extent of the deletion. 
